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EVIDENCE-NORTH CAROLINA AND DECLARATIONS
AGAINST PENAL INTEREST-State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709,
249 S.E.2d 429 (1978).
A New Rule: What Does It Mean?
INTRODUCTION
Nearly one hundred and fifty years ago, the North Carolina
Supreme Court acknowledged the apparent absurdity of convicting
one for a crime to which another had confessed extra-judicially
without permitting introduction of that confession as proof of the
accused'sinnocence.' The emotional appeal of the court's statement
notwithstanding, a majority of states have barred such confessions
through their courts' refusal to recognize the declaration against
penal interest exception to the hearsay rule.' While sound eviden-
tiary theory buttresses the majority's position, at least from an his-
torical perspective, the erosion of the hearsay rule, among other
factors, has led a growing minority of states to adopt the penal
interest exception in some form.3
Using the opportunity afforded by State v. Haywood
(hereinafter Haywood), Chief Justice Sharp announced that in the
future North Carolina will adhere to the growing minority's position
by allowing admission of such declarations upon the satisfaction of
specified conditions. Since the court decided Haywood on other
grounds, the announcement was dicta; however, without a whole-
sale change in attitude, undoubtedly the principle of Haywood will
become law. Accordingly, this note will treat the penal interest ex-
ception as such and will review its history, rationale and conse-
quences.
THE CASE
Clinton police arrested five individuals in connection with the
robbery of a grocery store and the shooting of the proprietor. Four
of those arrested, Paul Haywood, John Brown, James Watkins and
Ronald Covington, were subsequently indicted for assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury' and rob-
1. State v. May, 15 N.C. 328, 332 (1833).
2. 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 147 (Brandis Rev. 1973).
3. See HACK, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility
Under an Emerging Majority Rule, 56 BOSTON,U.L. REv. 148 (1976).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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bery with firearms.5 Upon the state's motion and without objection
by the defendants' counsel, the court consolidated the four cases for
trial.'
Eyewitnesses to the robbery placed all four defendants at the
crime scene, but neither they nor the wounded proprietor could
identify which of the four entered the grocery store and which
remained in the "getaway car." This lack of identification was one
factor which prompted the state to prosecute on a joint venture
theory. Defendants offered no evidence; but on cross-examination
of the investigating officer, defendants Brown and Covington sought
to elicit testimony concerning a written confession made by defend-
ant Haywood which they felt would exonerate them. The statement
was: "I came to Clinton from D.C. with James and Linda Watkins,
John Brown and Ronald Covington. We stopped at Jackson's Red
and White in Clinton. I went in to rob the store but Mr. Jackson
put up such a fight that I shot him and ran out of the store." Counsel
for Haywood objected to the admission of the confession as violative
of his client's constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona7 be-
cause Haywood had not been told that his statement could be used
against him. Counsel specifically stated that his other client, Wat-
kins, had no objection. The court sustained Haywood's motion for
suppression and the other defendants excepted. The jury found all
four guilty as charged.
On appeal to the North-Carolina Supreme Court, Covington,
Brown and Watkins conceded that Haywood's confession was inad-
missible against him due to the Miranda defect but asserted that
since the confession was voluntary with nothing indicating falsity
and since it tended to exonerate them, fair play required the judge
to allow the jury to hear it regardless of the incriminatory effect on
Haywood. The court disagreed, holding that the admission of Hay-
wood's statement would have bolstered the state's case against all
defendants and therefore its exclusion was not prejudicial. In fur-
ther support of the trial court's action, Chief Justice Sharp noted
that the ruling was in accord with "prior decisions of this court
holding inadmissible declarations against penal interest." At this
point the Chief Justice announced the new policy of the court that
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The female, Evette Watkins,
entered a plea of guilty to common law robbery and therefore was not a defendant
in this case.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-926(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709, 721, 249 S.E.2d 429, 437 (1978).
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declarations against penal interest are admissible under certain cir-
cumstances.
BACKGROUND
A. HEARSAY AND PENAL INTEREST IN GENERAL
The rule against the use of hearsay became fixed between 1675
and 1690.1 While the lack of oath and the inability to confront the
declarant and observe his demeanor are among the reasons cited in
support of the rule, 0 authorities generally agree that the main justi-
fication for the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of opportunity for
cross-examination." Cross-examination has always been deemed of
paramount importance in assuring the veracity and accuracy of
testimony. Without this right to interrogate a declarant, the pre-
sumed unreliability of out-of-court statements compels their exclu-
sion."2
Exceptions to the rule developed immediately 3 and are devel-
oping continuously, based on two basic principles: necessity' and
circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. 5 Necessity is the con-
cept that the court either accepts the evidence, although hearsay,
or loses it forever because of the unavailability of the declarant.
Unavailability may be due to death, absence from the jurisdiction
or insanity." Although unavailability of the declarant alone is not
reason enough to make hearsay statements admissible, 7 its effect is
to force the courts to look for circumstantial probability of trustwor-
thiness as a practical substitute for the ordinary test of reliability
(i. e., cross-examination).
The admission of declarations against interest is a classic exam-
ple of an exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule utilizing the
above-mentioned principles. The elements for the admission of such
declarations are: 1) the declarant must be unavailable; 2) the fact
stated must be against the declarant's interest when made and he
must be conscious that it is so; 3) the declarant must have compe-
9. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974).
10. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § 139.
11. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 245 (2d ed. 1972); 5
J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1362.
12. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 9, at § 1362.
13. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § 144, n. 67.
14. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1421.
15. Id. at § 1422.
16. Id. at § 1421.
17. Raleigh Improvement Co. v. Andrews, 176 N.C. 280, 96 S.E. 1032 (1918).
1979]
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tent knowledge of the fact declared; 4) no probable motive for the
declarant to falsify may exist; 5) the interest must be a pecuniary
or proprietary one.' The first element is a restatement of the un-
availability principle while the second through the fifth reflect
courts' attempts to assure the circumstantial probability of reliabil-
ity. The fifth element, a pecuniary or proprietary interest as op-
posed to a penal interest, prevents a defendant in a criminal case
in the majority of jurisdictions from using the confession of another
to prove his own innocence.1'
The distinction in admissibility between a penal interest and a
pecuniary or proprietary interest is attributed generally to the
Sussex Peerage Case,20 an 1844 decision of the House of Lords hold-
ing the hearsay rule "to exclude the statement of a fact subjecting
the declarant to a criminal liability."'21 Wigmore criticizes the case 22
and indeed calls it a "backward step, ' 23 citing four prior cases and
commentaries recognizing declarations against penal interest as
competent evidence.24 The criticisms notwithstanding, the case is
probably still good law in England, 25 and American courts fre-
quently cite it as authority.2
B. PENAL INTEREST IN NORTH CAROLINA
As is true in many states, the development of the penal interest
exception in North Carolina was not based exclusively on its own
merits but was influenced by other evidentiary doctrines. 27 State v.
Maya (hereinafter May) an 1833 decision, proved to be the progeni-
tor of just such an interface. Daniel May, accused of stealing and
selling a slave, 29 offered to prove that police had issued a warrant
for William May, Hardy May and Daniel May for the same offense
for which he solely was indicted; that William had absconded from
18. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § 147.
19. Id.
20. 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844).
21. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1476.
22. Id. at 88 1476-1477.
23. Id. at § 1476.
24. Id. at § 1476, n. 8, citing Hulet's Trial, 5 How. St. Tr. 1185 (1660); 1
HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 306 (1680); Standen v. Standen, 3 Peake 32 (1791);
Powell v. Harper, 5 Car. & P. 590 (1833).
25. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1476.
26. E.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Hines v. Common-
wealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
27. See, e.g., 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1477.
28. 15 N.C. 328 (1833).
29. Id. at 330 (theft of a slave was punishable by death).
[Vol. 1:161
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the state after conveying a woman and child slave to the complain-
ant as compensation for the loss of her slave and that William had
confessed extra-judicially that he alone was the thief. The trial court
allowed admission of certain of the facts but excluded the confes-
sion.30 On appeal of Daniel May's conviction, the supreme court
affirmed, with each of its three members expressing his concurring
views in a separate opinion. Chief Justice Ruffin rejected the prof-
fered confession as "mere hearsay. . . the words of a stranger to the
parties."' 1 Justice Gaston wrote, "I am of the opinion the whole of
the testimony offered in order to show the taking by William was
[inadmissible]. ' 3 He reasoned that "the question of William
May's guilt or innocence was not necessarily connected with that of
the guilt or innocence of Daniel. Both might be guilty or both might
be innocent, and a common guilt or a common innocence was as
presumable as the guilt of one only. ' 33 Subsequently, courts inter-
preted May as standing for the two doctrines that: 1) declarations
against penal interest are not admissible as they are in violation of
the hearsay rule34 and 2) defendant in a criminal trial cannot offer
proof that another person committed the offense "unless it was
one that could have been committed only by a single individual act-
ing alone ' 35 (hereinafter the "exclusive guilt" doctrine). 3
Some comment is necessary to appreciate the significance of
May. First, the ruling that the confession was inadmissible was not
surprising in that North Carolina did not recognize any declaration
against interest exception 37 until Peck v. Gilmer,38 some six years
later. Second, the declaration against penal interest question
usually arises in cases where a defendant is attempting to exculpate
himself by showing the confession of another to the crime .3 Third,
when declarations against penal interest arise in civil cases, courts
often interpret them as being against pecuniary interest.40
30. Id. at 329 (the court allowed admission of the warrant and the evidence of
flight by William).
31. Id. at 332.
32. Id. at 339.
33. Id. at 338.
34. E.g., State v. English, 201 N.C. 295, 159 S.E. 318 (1931).
35. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § 93, n. 6.
36. The name "exclusive guilt" doctrine is a creation of this author for the sake
of brevity.
37. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § 147, n. 59.
38. 20 N.C. 391 (1839).
39. See State v. Gee, 92 N.C. 756 (1885); State v. Baxter, 82 N.C. 602 (1880);
State v. Haynes, 71 N.C. 79 (1874).
40. "IThe tendency seems to be to emphasize the' pecuniary aspect when the
declaration is offered in a civil case, while emphasizing the penal aspect of a
1979]
5
Meekins: Evidence - North Carolina and Declarations Against Penal Interest
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Given the three facts above-mentioned and the "exclusive
guilt" doctrine of May, the North Carolina position barring admis-
sion of penal interest declarations became very difficult to change.
The interface of the above-mentioned facts and doctrine was as
follows: once courts admitted as competent evidence some types of
declarations against interest, logic argued for the admission of penal
interest declarations." However, because of the way in which these
questions generally arose, the "exclusive guilt" doctrine of May still
prevented their admission as they were attempts to prove the inno-
cence of the defendant by demonstrating the guilt of another. To
further doom the penal interest exception, any pressures for admis-
sion that came from the civil side were negated by the simple con-
version of penal interest into the then admissible pecuniary interest.
On several occasions the court reviewed its position but respect-
fully declined the invitation to change. In State v. Duncan,'2 the
court held that other persons' threats to kill or confessions of killing
a deceased were but hearsay and could not tend to establish that
both they and the defendant were not guilty. In 1872 the court in
State v. White'" held- that neither the acts nor the declarations of
the third party were inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant
and excluded both as hearsay.
As the cases continued, the "exclusive guilt" doctrine of May
came under great pressure. As noted by Stansbury, "[Tihe unrea-
sonableness of such a rule and the unjust results which it invited
are apparent."" In 1914, the court in State v. Wiggins5 liberalized
the rule by allowing admission of evidence that exculpated the de-
fendant by incriminating third parties as long as "direct evidence
connecting the others with the corpus delecti"'1 existed. The rule
continues to evolve. Today the general principle of relevancy gov-
erns the admissibility of evidence of another's guilt.
In 1931, after the emasculation of the "exclusive guilt" doc-
trine, in State v. English'8 (hereinafter English) the court had a
comparable declaration when offered in a criminal case." 1 D. STANSBURY, supra
note 2, at § 147, n. 60.
41. Stansbury calls any attempt to distinguish the penal interest from the
pecuniary or propriety interest "both illogical and unfair." 1 D. STANSBURY,
supra note 2, at § 147.
42. 28 N.C. 326 (1846).
43. 68 N.C. 158 (1873).
44. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § 93.
45. 171 N.C. 813, 89 S.E. 58 (1916).
46. Id. at 816, 89 S.E. at 59.
47. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § 93.
48. 201 N.C. 295, 159 S.E. 318 (1931).
[Vol. 1:161
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chance to review the penal interest exception on its own merits.
English demonstrates the rule's tenacity. The state charged the
defendant with the brutal murder of his wife. The defendant offered
to prove (an offer the trial court rejected) that one "D.L." made a
full detailed confession in the presence of three policemen justone
day after the murder."9 For some unknown reason, the police re-
leased the confessor and he quickly disappeared. A jury convicted
the defendant of second-degree murder 0 on the testimony of a boy
alleged to be of bad character. On review of the trial court's exclu-
sion of the third party's confession, Justice Brogden, writing for the
supreme court, went to great effort to examine the pros and cons of
the penal interest rule and the approaches taken by other jurisdic-
tions. In summation he wrote: "[T]he writer of this opinion, speak-
ing for himself, strings along with the minority, but it was the duty
of the trial judge to apply the law as written, and the exceptions of
the defendant are not sustained."'" The equities of the case notwith-
standing, the court refused to change the rule in North Carolina
citing stare decisis as the reason. The English case proved to be
the last serious challenge to the North Carolina position until the
supreme court's announcement in State v. Haywood;
ANALYSIS
Declarations against penal interest are now admissible as com-
petent evidence in North Carolina upon satisfying the following
seven conditions:
1) The declarant must be unavailable. In addition to the usual
methods of satisfying the unavailability requirement (death, out
of reach of process and physical or mental illness sufficient to
preclude appearance), 52 the court added unavailability due to a
ruling on grounds of self-incrimination. Also, where appropriate,
the court may require a good faith effort to secure the attendance
of the declarant.
2) The declaration must have had the potential of actually
jeopardizing the personal liberty of the declarant when made, and
he must have understood its damaging potential.
3) The declarant must have had no probable motive to falsify
when he made the declaration.
49. Id. at 298, 159 S.E. at 319 (the confession included a description of the
deceased's "house, the condition of the body and the entire condition of the
woman as she was afterwards found").
50. Id. (the state tried the defendant for first degree murder; the jury's ver-
dict was for second degree asking "the mercy of the court").
51. Id. at 300, 159 S.E. at 320.
52. 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence § 618 (1967).
19791
7
Meekins: Evidence - North Carolina and Declarations Against Penal Interest
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
4) The declaration must have been voluntary.
5) The declarant must have been in a position to have commit-
ted the crime.
6) The facts and circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crime and the making of the declaration must corroborate
the declaration and indicate the probability of trustworthiness.
7) The admission must be that the declarant committed the
crime for which the defendant is on trial, and the admission must
be inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant.3
The trial judge will make the initial determination as to admis-
sibility upon a voir dire out of the presence of the jury.
Drawing from a review of the North Carolina cases on point,5
notable cases from other jurisdictions" and the works of numerous
authorities," the court found much support for the new position.
Among the more traditional arguments favoring the penal interest
exception which the court noted were: that a person's desires to
avoid criminal liability are as strong as his desires to protect eco-
nomic interest, and therefore his declarations are as reliable; that
penal interest could logically include pecuniary interest and that
excluding penal interest permits manifest injustice." The court dis-
cussed at length the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Chambers v. Mississippi" in which Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, described the exclusion of the declaration against penal
interest while admitting declarations against pecuniary interest as
a "materialistic limitation."" The court emphasized that Chambers
held a declaration against interest to be "critical evidence";w and
its exclusion, coupled with a refusal to permit cross-examination,
was a denial of due process. The Chief Justice noted that notwith-
standing the specific limitation of Chambers to its facts, "any re-
consideraton of the admissibility of declarations against penal inter-
est must take Chambers v. Mississippi into account."" Also men-
53. For purposes of this note, the author changed the sequence of the condi-
tions proposed by the court.
54. The court cited: State v. Madden, 292 N.C. 114, 232 S.E.2d 656 (1977);
State v. English, 201 N.C. 295, 159 S.E. 318 (1931); State v. May, 15 N.C. 328
(1833).
55. E.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Hines v. Common-
wealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
56. E.g., C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1954); 1 D.
STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE (Brandis Rev. 1973).
57. 295 N.C. at 724, 249 S.E.2d at 438.
58. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
59. Id. at 299.
60. Id. at 302.
61. 295 N.C. at 726, 249 S.E.2d at 440.
[Vol. 1:161
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tioned by the court as inducements were the recent trend favoring
admission of such declarations2 and the newly enacted Federal
Rules of Evidence providing for the penal interest exception."
Balanced against the pro-admission arguments were several
policy statements that expressed the widely held fears of the inten-
tional abuse the change would invite. Examples include that the
change would open a door to a "flood of perjured witnesses falsely
testifying to confessions that were never made"6 ' and that one crimi-
nal with little to lose might try to exculpate another.u Of course,
mentioned also were the traditional hearsay arguments such as: lack
of cross-examination of the declarant, lack of confrontation and lack
of an oath.
As analysis of the conditions for admission makes clear, if the
arguments for admission won the war, the arguments against admis-
sion won some battles. The first through the third conditions (una-
vailability, actual jeopardy and no motive to falsify) are the usual
requirements for any declaration against interest6 with the unavail-
ability element modified to protect the constitutional right against
self-incrimination. The fourth condition (the admission must be
voluntary) is probably inherent in the admission of any type of
declaration and certainly so as regards any confession. The fifth and
sixth conditions (the declarant must have been in a position to have
committed the crime and the facts and circumstances must indicate
the probability of trustworthiness) represent the battles won by the
anti-admission arguments. As noted by the court, these require-
ments are accepted universally 6 to aid in the prevention of perjured
testimony and falsified confessions. No reason is given, however,
why the likelihood of perjury is any greater in penal interest decla-
rations than any other types, which are equally admissible in crimi-
nal trials. The two conditions seem a small price to pay for the
admission of evidence that might have tremendous impact in a
criminal trial. No doubt, the defendants in May and English would
not have complained.
The seventh condition (the admission must be that the declar-
ant committed the crime for which the defendant is on trial and
62. Hack, supra note 3, at 149.
63. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
64. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 255 (1954).
65. 295 N.C. at 727, 249 S.E.2d at 440, citing: S. SALTZBURG AND K. REDDEN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 602 (2d ed. 1977) (explanatory comment on
Rule 804(B)(3)).
66. See D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § 147.
67. See 295 N.C. at 727-30, 249 S.E.2d at 440-42.
19791
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must be inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant) is most diffi-
cult to rationalize. The apparent effect of this condition is to limit
the use of declarations against penal interest to criminal trials, qual-
ified by the further requirements that the declaration be a confes-
sion to the crime being tried, and that the crime be one which only
one of the two could have committed. This condition seems to re-
flect the position taken by the court in 1883 in State v. Beverly, 8
that if a crime could be committed by two people as well as one,
proof that one person is guilty does not in the least tend to establish
the innocence of another. 9 When viewed in this light, the seventh
condition is a strict rule of relevancy and amounts to a restatement
of the "exclusive guilt" doctrine that developed from State v. May. 0
It seems an unnecessary complication that precludes the use of
declarations against penal interest by the defendant except in very
narrow circumstances-by the prosecution7 and in all civil cases-
without adding to the assurances of reliability already present in the
fifth and sixth conditions.
CONCLUSION
The proposed declaration against penal interest exception out-
lined in Haywood may be too narrow to be of any practical signifi-
cance. Because the admission vel non of the declaration will be a
discretionary ruling,72 reversible only for abuse of discretion,73 the
scope of the new rule will be determined at the trial level. Should
the trial judges opt for a strict interpretation of all the conditions
68. 88 N.C. 632 (1883).
69. Id. at 633.
The straightforward answer to this statement is that as a matter of logic
it is not true . . . . [Ihf it appears likely or possible that two or more
persons acted in concert, this will lessen the weight of the evidence in the
defendant's favor, but it is the function of the jury to determine such
questions of weight and credibility.
1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § 93, n. 8.
70. 15 N.C. 328 (1833).
71. Whether the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), totally eliminates such use by the prosecution is not
clear.
72. 295 N.C. at 730, 249 S.E.2d at 442.
73. See, e.g., University Motors, Inc. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 266
N.C. 251, 146 S.E.2d 102 (1966); Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. and Sales
Co., 259 N.C. 400, 131 S.E.2d 9 (1963); Invesco Financial Services v. Elks, 29 N.C.
App. 512, 224 S.E.2d 660 (1976); Williams v. Duke Power Co., 26 N.C. App. 392,
216 S.E.2d 482 (1975); McGrady v. Quality Motors of Elkin, Inc., 23 N.C. App.
256, 208 S.E.2d 911 (1974).
[Vol. 1:161
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for admission, the rule will "freeze" with little hope of liberaliza-
tion.
Three areas of interpretation could make the difference be-
tween a viable rule concerning declarations against penal interest
and one of little import. First, the courts must make some accom-
modation for use of the rule in civil cases, the possible conversion
of penal interest to pecuniary interest notwithstanding. The court
in Haywood tacitly acknowledged the usefulness of the rule; and the
inclusion of certain of the conditions show that, as to admissibility,
the court was discussing only the criminal side. For use in civil
cases, the same conditions as for any other declaration against inter-
est should apply.
Second, in discussing other courts' interpretations of the condi-
tion that the statement actually must have jeopardized the liberty
of the declarant, the court quoted Pitts v. State," a Florida decision,
that "an admission by one who had already admitted or been con-
victed of other similar crimes could hardly be said to be against his
penal interest. 7 5 Such an interpretation of the against interest con-
dition is too restrictive. One wonders what past confessions to other
crimes has to do with any present confession. The question is not
the severity of the penalty to which the declarant subjected himself,
but rather did the statement subject him to potential penalty. The
possibility of concurrent or consecutive sentences for additional
crimes and their consequent effect on such issues as paroles should
qualify a statement as being against penal interest. The fact that
the declarant had "little" to lose goes to the weight of the evidence,
not its admissibility.
The third area of interpretation may be the most critical. The
seventh condition of admission, that the guilt of the declarant and
the defendant be "inconsistent," is capable of at least two interpre-
tations: 1) that their guilt must be mutually exclusive or 2) that
defendant's claim of innocence be to some degree enhanced by the
statements of the declarant. The latter interpretation is preferable
in that it allows the recognition of the declaration against penal
interest rule within the full range of.its potential uses. 6 Any possi-
74. 307 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 918 (1975).
75. 295 N.C. at 729, 249 S.E.2d at 442.
76. This is especially true in light of the general rule that declarations against
interest are admissible in their entirety. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § 147. A
strict interpretation would preclude the use of a declaration where a third party's
confession to a totally unrelated crime might cast some light on the innocence of
the defendant. See State v. Gardner, 13 Wash. App. 194, 534 P.2d 140 (1975). It
would also preclude the use of a confession by an accomplice of defendant that he,
19791
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bilities of abuse that are created by this broader interpretation are
negated by the prosecution's right to enter evidence that could
lessen the weight of the declaration in the mind of the trier of fact.
Fortunately, the announcement in Haywood is dicta. That fact
is a blessing because it gives the attorneys of North Carolina an
opportunity to evaluate, discuss and, if necessary, criticize the rule
as explained by the court before its implementation. The final form
of the declaration against penal interest exception to hearsay in
North Carolina may be substantially different from that introduced
in the Haywood decision.
Samuel W Meekins
the accomplice, was the one who "pulled the trigger." While such a confession
would not exculpate the defendant, it certainly would prove material to the sent-
encing.
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